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[转载] 美国外交智库斯金纳:苏联是西方内部斗争,中国才是根本的长期威胁(全文

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发表于 2019-5-16 20:33:21 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式

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【访谈题目】对于2030年的挑战,美国国务院是怎么看的?
时间:2019年4月29号星期一
地点:首都华盛顿
举办单位:“新美国”暨亚利桑那州立大学
【“未来安全论坛”是美国一年一度的论坛。始于2015年。原来称作 Future of War Conference “战争之未来研讨会”。一直由“新美国”和亚利桑那州立大学联合主办。“新美国”是美国公共知识分子的非党派的国事智库,成立于1999年。色彩是自由偏左。】

Speakers appearing in the video footage:
讲话人:

丹尼尔·洛登堡:亚利桑那州立大学教授,“新美国”成员,论坛主持
安玛丽·斯劳特:"新美国"主席,奥巴马时期的国务院政策设计室主任
凯伦·斯金纳:现任国务院政策设计室主任

划重点:


斯劳特:我来总结一下特朗普主义。美国是一个主权国家,遵循其国家利益,奉行“如果你为我做,如果我们分摊负担,我就为你做”。这是一种现实主义的世界观。可能不否定多边主义,可是一定是以本国为先,不接受任何对主权的限制。我还想知道,我得问问,什么是蓬佩奥的派生思想。有什么特别的不同吗?

Slinner:Yes. In fact Pompeo asked me that very question as so. I said I'll tell you when I know.  But what I think is going on at the State Department under him is that he's attempting to really define in the broad Trump doctrine which addresses economic and defense and a broad range of policy challenges. But what I think Pompeo doctrine is, is trying to define the diplomatic angle in all aspects of what the president's attempting to do:in security, society, the economy, energy and the international system. And in each of those looking at what's the role of the policy.

斯金纳:是有啊。其实蓬佩奥也问了我同样的问题。我说我知道了再跟你说。我觉得,国务院在他的领导下,想在广义上界定特朗普主义。涉及经济、防务,广泛的政策挑战。蓬佩奥主义,就是从外交角度来看总统关注的方方面面:安全、社会、经济、能源、国际体系。确定(外交)政策在每一方面的作用。

Because you know we have a huge defense department, with a big budget, and a lots of boots on the ground all over the world. We don't have as much status as you know. The building just physically tell you a bit about the reality. But the budgets tell you even more. And so trying to assert an American diplomacy in all of these core areas is what I think the Pompeo Corolary to the Trump Doctrine. We were working on that. It's a lot of fun. We have diverse groups of people in Policy Planning, careers, political appointees. There I don't have a political litmus test.  If you are good, you are there. Especially on the career side, on the political side, you do have to bring people in to represent the point of view. But again, some of most talented people I've ever met in the foreign service and civil service.

我们的国防部非常庞大,有庞大的预算,军人遍布全世界。我们国务院的地位就差远了。从办公大楼的大小就可以看出一点这种现实。而预算更能说明问题。我认为蓬佩奥基于特朗普主义的派生思想就是在所有这些核心领域里强调美国外交的作用。我们在这方面做了工作。很有意思。我们政策设计室里有不同的群体,不同的职业经历,不同的行政人员。我不搞政治倾向性的测验。你行,你就来上班。特别是职业经历方面,政治方面,还是要把不同的人招进来,代表不同的观点。在外交和行政事务上有一些我遇到的最有才干的人。

Slaughter: So I want to ask you about how you engage in the diplomacy in a world in whcih -- we are talking about this a lot today --  the President essentially said, in the national security strategy, we see a return to great power competition. So China now and Russia and any others countries --I want to ask you, you might name -- are seen as great powers to whom we are adverse at least much of the time. How does that affect the way the State Department, the entire European department which addresses all of Europe and Russia, and of course East Asian Affairs focused on China. How does that affect the diplomacy to now see them as rival great powers.

斯劳特:那么我就想问你,你是怎样参与在这样一个世界上的外交 -- 今天我们谈了不少 -- 特朗普总统等于是说,在国家安全战略方面,我们回归到了大国竞争。那么,中国、俄国、还有其他什么国家 -- 我想知道,你可以说 -- 被视为与我们作对的大国,至少多数情况下是这样。那么,这对于国务院、对于管整个欧洲和俄国的欧洲组、对于主管中国的东亚组,有什么影响吗?把它们看成大国对手,对外交有什么影响吗?

Skinner:The National Security Strategy was an important document early on in the Trump administration for all the noise that people talked about at the White House and the fact that we were quickly onto our second national security adviser and new deputies. We in record time got a powerful statement in the National Security Strategy of December 2017 and it talked about a return to great power competition and that was a general H.R. McMaster's, I think, big insight. I think we've evolved since then that we do have Russia and China as great power competitors. They've been that for a long time, a lot of this is are cognition of the reality that's been on the ground. But I think we're differentiating those challenges. Russia is more of a kind of a global survivor, I think, in its great power status. But China we see it as a more fundamental long term threat. That's not a partisan issue. And one of the ways in which Donald Trump has contributed to a bipartisan foreign policy consensus is on China.  Because at the start of his presidency there wasn't the kind of understanding that China is the long term threat. It is a real problem.

斯金纳:《国家安全战略》是特朗普政府初期的一份重要文件。那时白宫众说纷纭,很快就有了第二任国家安全顾问,和新的副手。2017年12月,出了《国家安全战略》,这么快就有了一个有力的宣言,在时间上创了纪录。它说的是回归大国竞争。我想,是出于一位将军,麦克马斯特的出色的洞见。【麦克马斯特:美国陆军中将。2017年任特朗普的国家安全顾问,2018年退休】自从那时起我们发展了我们的观点,俄国和中国确实是我们的竞争大国。它们早就是了。主要是对现场现实的认识。我想我们也是区分这些挑战的。我觉得作为大国,俄国更像是国际遗老。而中国,我们认为是更为根本的长期的威胁。两党对此没有分歧。特朗普对两党在外交政策上达成共识的贡献之一就是中国问题。他刚当选总统的时候,人们还不大明白中国是长期的威胁。的确成问题。

Slaughter:So when you say "threat" I would probably say "adversary", I'm not saying "threat".

斯劳特:你说是“威胁”,我可能说是“对手”,不说是“威胁”。

Skinner:I think the vocabulary is still evolving and I would agree with you that it is an adversary. It's in this way. It's a long term fight with China, or a long term competition. It has, I think, historical, ideological and cultural as well as strategic factors that a lot of Americans do not understand, even in the foreign policy community.  To map our chart, our understanding of the world, onto theirs, I think it's a huge mistake. And what we are working on at the State Department is a comprehensive China policy now.  A lot of that is being led on the seventh floor at State, but in close concert with all of the bureaus who are thinking about this regional and functional at the core of their work now.

斯金纳:我想,提法还在发展中。我没准也会同意你说的是“对手”。是这样的。与中国的斗争、或者说与中国的竞争是长期的。我想,很多美国人不理解其中的历史、意识形态、文化以及战略方面的因素。就是搞外交政策的也不理解。把我们对世界的观念、我们对世界的理解安在他们头上,是一种巨大的错误。现在我们在国务院搞的就是全方位的对华政策。主要是国务院七楼主导,也和所有在区域和职能方面有关的部门密切合作,作为他们的核心工作。

Slaughter:Is a strategic and economic dialogue still going with China? Tim Geithner started this. There had been the strategic economic dialogue led by Treasury. Actually that was under George W. Bush and then when Secretary Clinton came in, it became the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, meaning the State Department led it, not Treasury. But I don't know.

斯劳特:与中国还在进行战略和经济对话吗?是从蒂莫西·盖特纳【奥巴马时期的财政部长,中文名“高逸然”】开始的,进行了财政部主导的战略经济对话。其实是在小布什主政时期开始的。后来希拉里成了国务卿,就成了战略经济对话,也就是国务院而不是财政部主导了。我也不太清楚。

Skinner:So this is a very different administration and what the economists and financial people at the White House got hold of China faster than State. And so they've addressed the China trade problem. But what we're doing at State is to say we're in agreement with you on trade, but trade is not the only problem. And maybe not the biggest in the long run with China and perhaps it's really a symptom of the China problem which has deeper historical and strategic roots than we've understood. We have the Indo-Pacific and the trade side.  Those are the ones that raced ahead faster but we're now looking more deeply and broadly at China and I think State is in the lead in that broader attempt to get something like a letter X for China,what Kennan wrote. You can't have a policy without an argument underneath it. What hasn't happened in this century is that we haven't advanced the argument and that's what we're working on both the argument and the broader threat at State. And if it will happen, it will happen at the State Department.

斯金纳:本届政府是很不一样的。是白宫搞经济的、搞财政的比国务院要更早地应对中国。他们搞的是与中国的贸易问题。而我们国务院虽然也同意与中国有贸易问题,但是认为并不只是贸易问题。长远来说可能并不是与中国最大的问题。也许只是中国问题的一个表象,有更深的历史、战略根源,超出我们的理解。我们有印度洋-太平洋和贸易这一方面的问题。这些是先冒出来的问题。而我们现在是要从深度上和广度上来看待中国问题。我想国务院在广度方面起到了主导作用。要为中国搞一个类似凯南写的X信件的东西。【凯南X信件:实为凯南以X为笔名在1947年发表的一篇文章,鼓吹遏制政策】。一种政策不能没有理论支撑。本世纪没有的,就是我们还没有搞出理论来。我们国务院正在搞的就是理论和那个广度的威胁。如果出了理论,就是国务院出的。

So it's different than Russia in that way. It's different as an adversarial dyad than in the 20th century with the Soviet Union, in the sense that not to make light of the Cold War and the reality of a nuclear war that could have happened. In fact that we came close in some instances. But when we think about the Soviet Union in that competition, in a way it was a fight within the Western family. Karl Marx was a German Jew who developed a philosophy that was really within the larger body of political thought that reaches the work that you've done, that I've been involved with,  that has some tenets even within classical liberalism. So in that way I think it was a huge fight within the Western family. You could look at the Soviet Union, part west, part east, but it had some openings there that got us the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which was a really important western concept that opened the door really to undermine the Soviet Union, a totalitarian state on human rights principles.

在这个意义上,中国与俄国不同。作为对手,与20世纪的苏联不同。这么说不是看轻冷战,看轻可能发生的核战争。实际上有几次离核战争很近了。我们讲与苏联竞争,在某种意义上是西方大家庭内部的斗争。卡尔·马克思是德国犹太人,他发展了一种哲学,是在更大的一种政治思想范畴内。这种思想也出现在你写的、我涉及的东西里。这种思想甚至包含着经典自由主义的某些基本理念。在这个意义上,我觉得可以说是西方大家庭内部的大战。看看苏联,半西方、半东方,它有些空隙,让我们在1975年能有赫尔辛基协定【欧美东西方阵营的缓和协定,但没有法律效力】。那确实是一种重要的西方概念,打开了大门,削弱了苏联,一个违背人权原则的极权国家。

That's not really possible with China. This is a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology. The United States doesn't have that before, nor has it had an economic competitor the way that we have. The Soviet Union was a country with nuclear weapons, a hug Red Army, but a backwards economy. And that was the insight of Reagan when the intel community told him differently. He said I just don't see the signs that it can survive a technology race with the West. So in China we have an economic competitor. We have an ideological competitor, one that really does seek a kind of global reach that many of us didn't expect a couple of decades ago. I think it's also striking that's the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian.

而与中国,这就不可能。这是一种与完全不同的文明、不同的意识形态的斗争。美国过去还没有过,也没有过这样的经济竞争对手。苏联这个国家有核武器,庞大的红军,但是经济很落后。这是里根的洞见。而那时情报部门的报告是不同的。他说,我看不出苏联有什么迹象能在技术上竞争得过西方。而中国是经济竞争对手,是意识形态竞争对手。它确实是企图把手伸向全球,而我们许多人在几十年前是根本想不到的。我觉得很震撼的是,这是我们第一次要有一个非白种人的大国竞争对手。

Slaughter:That sounds like Huntington's Clash of Civilizations.

斯劳特:这像是亨廷顿的“文明冲突论”。

Skinner: Some of those tenets but a little bit different. All of those things together are a bit perplexing for the American foreign policy establishment.  I think we have to take the rose colored glasses off and get real about the nature of the threat.  I think we also have to give a kind of respect for what the Chinese seek to accomplish.

斯金纳:有些基本理念是,可是也有些不同。所有这些东西合在一起,让美国外交政策圈子感到很困惑。我觉得我们应该摘下玫瑰色的有色眼镜,看清这种威胁的本质。我也觉得还应该对中国想达到的目标给予某种尊敬。

Slaughter:  I'm gonna turn to the audience in just a minute. So start thinking about your questions. I do want to press you on that. In the United States,  is not all the Caucasian, right? But we're going to be minority by 2050.  So is that even relevant? I mean if I think about the people so, the different races and ethnicities that will make up the United States, Caucasians won't be a majority.

斯劳特:过一会儿就让听众提问,请准备你们的问题。我还想问你的是,在美国,不都是白人吧?到了2050年,我们就会成为少数民族。是不是白人还有关系吗?我是说,美国是由不同的种族和民族组成的,白人将来不会是多数了。

Skinner:I think it's extremely relevant because the foreign policy establishment is so narrowly defined. It's more homogeneous than probably should be, given our own demographics. That's why I think programs like the one at ASU that you've partnered with are extremely valuable in terms of developing new cadre of foreign policy elites. But when I look back to when we went to graduate school, who populates IR departments at the elite universities, (Slaughter: No question in it.) it hasn't changed very much.Look at the faculties of the top 20 IR programs and public policy schools. So I think you know having diversity in all dimensions really does help you get ready for the future. And when you don't have it I think it hurt you. The foreign policy elite community is pretty locked up right now. I hope that is changing.

斯金纳:我觉得非常非常有关系,因为外交政策圈子界定得很狭隘。看看我们的人口组成,它也过于清一色了。所以我觉得你们与亚利桑那州立大学合作的这个节目非常有价值,就在于形成新的外交政策精英群体。回想过去我们读研时,都是谁在读精英大学的国际关系(斯劳特:是啊),现在变化不大嘛。看看顶尖的20个国际关系项目和公共政策院系的教职员队伍。所以我觉得全方位地搞形形色色才能有助于为未来做好准备。如果不是这样,就会造成损害。而如今的外交政策精英圈子很封闭了。希望能有变化。

完整全文:


Rothenberg: So it comes to the final panel of the day: What does the State Department think the challenges in 2030s would be. We're really thrilled to be able to have the opportunity for Anne-Marie Slaughter, the CEO of New America, who was formerly the director of Policy Planning for the State Department, to have a conversation with Dr. Kiron Skinner, who's currently the director of Policy Planning for the State Department and also Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State. She is a professor who's on leave from Carnegie Mellon university where she directs the Center for international relations and politics, Institute for politics and strategy, and Institute for strategic analysis. Her areas of expertise are international relations, international security, US foreign policy, She's also the W. Glen Campbell research fellow at the Hoover institution. So welcome Dr. Skinner.

洛登堡:下面是今天最后一个话题: “对2030年代的挑战,国务院是怎么想的?”。我们有请“新美国”主席、国务院政策设计室前主任安玛丽·斯劳特与国务院政策设计室现任主任、国务卿高级顾问凯伦·斯金纳博士对话。斯金纳博士是从卡内基梅隆大学调用的教授。她领导着国际关系与政治中心、政治与战略研究所、战略分析研究所。她的专业领域是国际关系、国际安全、美国外交政策。她也是胡佛研究所的研究员。让我们欢迎斯金纳博士。

Slaughter:  Well I will start by saying although I should call you Dr. Skinner or probably Director Skinner, we have known each other for a long time so I'm gonna call you Kiron. Just this is a historic moment.  There are two women directors of policy planning, sitting before you, something that could not have happened until you were appointed. It's a particular honor to have you in and welcome you. I actually want to start by asking you to just describe your career a little bit. You and I have similar pathways, and we have known each other for a long time. But how did you come to be director of policy planning?

斯劳特:我该称你为斯金纳博士,或者斯金纳主任。不过咱们是老相识了。还是叫你凯伦吧。今天可是历史性时刻。政策设计室居然有两个女性主任在听众面前。你要不是被任命,就不可能。非常荣幸能请到你光临。我想请你首先说说你的职业生涯。咱们两人仕途挺相似的。也是老相识了。先说说你是怎么当上政策设计室主任的?

Skinner: I wish I knew. I'll try to create a narrative. But you're absolutely right and we do have similar backgrounds. We were both at Harvard at the same time. You were moving faster than me and think you were doing two graduate degrees at one time. I think one of the first to do a PhD in political science and a law degree, and to get tenures. You were a big deal at Harvard in those days and you still are.

斯金纳:我要是知道就好了。我还是说说吧。你说的很对,我们是有相似的背景。我们都同时在哈佛读书。不过你上升得比我快。你同时读两个博士吧。你是第一个同时读政治学博士和法律博士的。成了终身教授。那时你在哈佛不得了啊,现在也是。

But I think for me the beginning was  --  I hope there are some young people left in the audience. But I came to Washington as an intern at 14 years old from the Bay area. My parents found a family for me to live with and I said I wanted to be an ambassador one day. I had no idea what that was.  But it sounded great and it meant that I can get away from my house. So that hasn't happened. But I did end up studying international relations and political science just as you did  as an undergraduate, and then on to Harvard, and to do my masters and PhD.  But along the way I met so many interesting people in the field. One of the great things about being at Harvard is that you get exposed to some of the top, I guess, global thought leaders very early. You make friends.  Around age 23 I met Condoleezza Rice, who was a junior faculty at Stanford.  I asked her to be on my dissertation committee, and is now an outside reader. That was important and met many more people later. I ended up doing the research for George Hewes memoir as still a Harvard graduate out at Stanford.  So all of those opportunities very early, that come with graduate school ,I think ,made a big difference for me. But then in terms of getting to the State Department I was on a number of presidential campaigns that I think you have never been on.

我的起家嘛 -- 希望听众里还有些年轻人 -- 我14岁从旧金山湾区到华盛顿做实习生。我父母呢,给了我一个家。我说有朝一日我要当大使。我其实并不知道大使是怎么回事。只是听起来挺不错的。就是说我能离开家了。不过我最终还是在大学本科学了国际关系和政治学。 跟你一样。后来又上了哈佛读硕士和博士。在这个过程中,我碰到了这个领域里很多很多的有意思的人。上哈佛的一个优越之处是能很早接触到顶尖的有全球思维的领军人物。交上了朋友。大概是23岁的时候,我遇见了赖斯,那时她是斯坦福的助理教授。我请她参加我的论文委员会。现在是我的外部审阅人。这很重要。后来又遇到了更多的人。最终我作为哈佛学生在斯坦福做了关于乔治·胡斯【美国革命导火线波士顿倾茶事件参与者】回忆录的研究。我想,就是读研的时候让我很早就有了这些机会,起了很大的作用。至于到国务院,是由于我参与了几次总统竞选活动。而你,我想是没有这个经历的。

Slaughter: We also have some differences .

斯劳特:我们也有不同的地方。

Skinner: George W. Bush, Newt Gingrich, Rand Paul. I think maybe we meet in the middle there. Then ultimately the Trump campaign and transition.  I enjoyed all of these.  Because I felt in the 2000s that there were set of structural changes that have been coming for a long time, even before the new century, both domestically and internationally. It would take kind of out-of-box thinking to address those. I thought we were stuck in some of the precepts, ideas, doctrines, and theories, that spoke to our strength and hegemony at the height of the cold war. But to survive the future we were going to have to talk to people in the middle of the country. We were going to have to talk about different issues. For me that was what got me to the Trump campaign and ultimately the State Department, which I think is a amazing government department. It is the oldest federal department. It's 230 years old.  This year will be celebrating on July 29th.  And it has some of the most committed public servants I've ever met. We all honor the military continuously.  But sometimes we forget that we have foreign service officers, civil servants and contractors along with political appointees who are putting themselves in harm's way and who are just committed to preserving our nation and supporting the world at the same time.

斯金纳:小布什、金戈里奇、兰德保罗(的竞选)。我想我们是在这期间遇见的。最后是特朗普竞选和过渡。我很高兴能参与这些活动。因为我觉得公元两千年时代,有一系列结构性变化,由来已久,在新世纪之前就开始了,有国内的,有国外的。对于这些变化,要有非常规的思维。我觉得,我们拘泥于某些清规戒律,某些概念,是在冷战高潮时形成的,是注重于我们的力量和霸权。可是要在未来站住脚,我们还得关注国家内地的人民。我们要关注各种不同的问题。这是我参与特朗普竞选活动的原因。导致我到了国务院。国务院可是很有特色的政府部门。它是最老资格的联邦部门。已经230岁了。今年7月29号要给它庆生。国务院有一些我所接触过的最敬业的公务员。我们总是要向军人致敬。但是我们有时忘记了我们还有外事官员、民事公务员、签约研究员以及行政人员。他们是冒着风险尽职尽力来保卫我们的国家,也同时支援世界。

Slaughter: Right. Having got you in the State Department I want to ask you about how you think about our foreign policies. So though this is a sophisticated audience and you know that the director of Policy Planning is an in-house think tank, is the big thing job. It is the place that the containment doctrine was born. Everybody who holds this role serves in the shadow of George Kennan, and containment, and the Marshall plan. And indeed George Marshall said to George Kennan when George Kennan became director of Policy Planning "avoid trivia". And that's on the coin and various mugs. And that Policy Planning puts up.

斯劳特:对。你进了国务院,我就想问你对我们外交政策的看法。虽然我们的观众见多识广,不过政策设计室是内部的智库。主任也是个要职。遏制政策就产生在政策设计室。在这个位置上的每一人都工作在乔治·凯南、遏制政策、马歇尔计划的阴影下。【乔治·凯南是政策设计室第一届主任。首先提出“遏制”战略,又译为“围堵”。马歇尔是当时的国务卿】当凯南成为政策设计室主任时,马歇尔对他说:“避免琐细”。这成为政策设计室的格言,印制在硬币和水杯上。

You have written in 2017 before you took on your current job. You have written about the Trump Doctrines. I want to start by asking you what is the Trump Doctrine.

斯劳特:你走马上任之前的2017年,你写了关于特朗普主义的文章。我想首先问你,什么是特朗普主义?

Skinner:  That's a tough one.  So I haven't written about it. I think it's been evolving.  But I say to audiences all the time now that part of my job is to provide an intellectual architecture for the Trump Doctrine. It doesn't happen in the Policy Planning which is the only form of foreign policy think tank at State, and hence the only form of think tank at the federal government.  It will not happen. But I also say that I'm providing the intellectual architecture for the Pompeo corollary and that the two go together.

斯金纳:这个问题可不容易回答。我其实没有写特朗普主义。我觉得它还在发展。不过,我总是对听众说,我的一部分职责就是为特朗普主义提供理论框架。政策设计室不产生特朗普主义。政策设计室是国务院唯一的外交政策智库,也是联邦政府唯一的外交智库。不会产生特朗普主义。不过我要说,我也为蓬佩奥的派生思想提供理论框架。这两者是捆绑在一起的。

In terms of the Trump Doctrine I think it is, in a kind of broad way, a set of pillars that address 21st century realities. One, the issue of national sovereignty.  And let me, just before I talk about it, say it that what I've been fascinated by is that Donald Trump probably has not studied international relations extensively ...

说到特朗普主义,我认为从广义的角度上说,是一套支柱,应对21世纪的现实问题。一个是国家主权。在谈这个问题之前,我要说,让我感到很有意思的是,特朗普大概并没有广泛地研究过国际关系, ....

Slaughter:  I think it's a fair statement.

斯劳特:这么说还是比较公正的。

Skinner:  ... and who has been a successful business man,  but who did study at Penn, and has ignited or re-ignited a strong theoretical debate with international relations, about the American role in the world, and about a lot of concepts that we thought we were settled.  And one of them is national sovereignty. I mention this because I've done some reading by your husband who was a classmate, an office mate of mine at Harvard,  and by Helen Milner. And they're really thinking creatively about these ideas.  And what Donald Trump did without attempting to do so is that he's really forced us to go back to first principles and say "where does national sovereignty fit?",  and American foreign policy, and international relations more broadly.  

斯金纳:.... 特朗普是一个成功的商人,不过也上过宾州大学。他触发了,或者说重新触发了激烈的理论争鸣:国际关系,美国在世界的角色,以及许多我们已经认为不成问题的概念。其中一个就是国家主权。我提这个是因为我读了你先生写的东西。他和我是哈佛同学、同事。也读了海伦·米尔纳写的。【斯劳特的先生 Andrew Moravcsik 和米尔纳都是普林斯顿大学的政治学教授,研究国际政治等。】他们在这些问题上都很有创见。特朗普没有去做的,正好迫使我们回到第一原理,要问“国家主权往哪里摆?”,还有美国的外交政策,更广泛地说,还有国际关系。

It's his view, with his talks about America first, that national sovereignty, for whatever its problems, and the nation state for whatever problems it may have, it's the best way to protect people and to allow for prosperity and human rights and civil rights in the world. And that there's no comparison.  That it is important international organizations in Lausanne and indeed they are important.  In the hierarchy the nation state matters.  And that the UN was founded on the nation states,  that the League of Nations was founded on nation states.  And I think he's been trying to advance the case that the nation state does have some core responsibilities around political and territorial sovereignty. And that no international organization can take for states. So it's been interesting to watch scholars debate things that we kind of assume we fully understood. So I think now we return to national sovereignty.

特朗普说美国优先,他的观点就是,国家主权--不管有什么问题,民族国家--不管有什么问题,是保护人民,带来繁荣,保障人权、民权的最好的方式。没什么能比得上它。洛桑有重要的国际组织,确实很重要。而在层次上,起作用的是民族国家。联合国是建立在民族国家之上的。国际联盟【二战前相当于今联合国的组织】是建立在民族国家之上的。我想特朗普主张的是,民族国家在政治主权和领土主权方面具有核心的责任。任何国际组织都不能替代国家。看着学者们辩论我们自以为完全理解的问题,也是挺有意思的。我想,现在我们回归到国家主权。

Slaugher:  So that's the first pillar.

斯劳特:这是第一个支柱。

Skinner: It's the key pillar related to that, the national interest.  That it, and not the interest of multilateral or international organizations, or transnational actors should guide what a nation naturally does.  And so let me just speak to that for a moment.  I think that all of these principles that he's attempting or pillars to establish, just like theoretical debate, understand that there are fundamental contradictions of intensions within them.  And so that's my job to think about those. I think the President provides the hunches and instincts.  And it's my job, and that of Secretary Pompeo,  to turn those hunches and instincts to hypotheses. So he talks about the national interests. It's really hard to say sometimes what an objective national interest is.  And you know that whole body of ...  he talks about in a very subjective way.  And so we're thinking about that hard at the state department.

斯金纳:是关键性的支柱,关系到国家利益。一个国家自然而然所遵循的,不应该是多边组织或国际组织的利益,而应该是国家利益。我就谈谈这个问题。我想,特朗普推行的这些原则、支柱,就像理论辩论,可以理解,其中包含了基本的矛盾。我的工作就是思考这些。我想,总统提供的是直觉,我的工作、国务卿蓬佩奥的工作就是把这些直觉变成理论。特朗普谈国家利益,而有时候很难说客观的国家利益是什么。他的谈论是非常主观的。我们在国务院就使劲地思考。

Another pillar has to do with reciprocity. And that international agreements, and trade negotiations should be marked by reciprocity that's clearly defined. And that he is, in a way, -- all of these principles are critique of what's been happening in the 21st century.

另一个支柱是“对等”。国际协定,贸易谈判,应该有清晰定义的“对等”。 这些原则都是针对着21世纪的情况而言的。

Another one is burden sharing. He fundamentally believes, and talks, all the time, especially those big rallies,  but also more thoughtfully in his anger speeches. And when he speaks abroad that we have to have a greater burden sharing simply because the US cannot take on the whole globe even though we provide extended nuclear deterrents for all of our allies, many of our near allies, and we provide conventional deterrents as well. So I think that conversation has been important.  During the campaign, as you know, he talked a lot about NATO.  And he talked about NATO in the context of campaigning in those thirty-odd flyover states that many foreign policy elites have ignored and that many presidential candidates frequently have ignored.  And he said in those speeches that resonated with people that is as important as NATO has been. It can't be the case that the US provides the lion share of defense security for 28 other countries, especially ones like Germany that have the capacity to do more.  But that is not a sustainable model. And he's stuck to his guns. And in the two years that he has been President NATO countries have put at least 41 billion dollars of additional money into defense spending.  Now I know it's multifactorial why that happen, but I have to believe that President Trump insisting of 2 percent of GDP toward the defense has to be a factor.

还有一个支柱是“分摊负担”。特朗普总是谈,特别是那些大国盟友。不过在他说气话时,也还是讲道理。他在国外说,负担要多分摊一些,因为美国虽然对所有盟友、许多准盟友提供了广泛的核保护,以及常规武器保护,可是没办法管到整个地球。所以他的谈话是很重要的。在竞选时,他多次提北约。他竞选时在中部三十多个州谈北约,而这些州恰恰是许多外交政策专家们所忽视的,许多总统候选人所忽视的。他把这些地方的人民看成是与北约一样重要,他的竞选讲话在那里产生了共鸣。美国对28个国家承担防务的大头是不行的。特别是像德国那样有能力负担更多的国家。那样是不可持续的。特朗普说到做到。他当选总统两年以来,北约国家在防务开支上至少多出了410亿美元。现在我知道,这是多种因素的结果。不过我认为,特朗普总统坚持要他们拿出GDP的百分之二用在防务上应该也是一个因素。

There are other principles. But these are some of the ones I think most capture the imagination of Americans, that you would have to be really or carve around them. I won't mention a forethought that I think isn't important. And a lot of the work has been done at the think tanks in Washington, including your own, which is doing I think some of the most interesting innovative work on the future of our role in the world.

还有其他一些原则。不过,我认为这些是最能抓住美国人民的想象力的,你得在围绕着它们做文章。我不会提我觉得不重要的预见。华盛顿的智库们做了很多工作,包括你自己的。在关于未来的世界上美国的角色问题上,我认为是做着最有意思、最有创见的工作。

And then that has to do with new regional partnerships. So I was at Harvard about a week ago. They let me back in. So we talked about this issue of multilateralism and partnerships. Some were trying to say that we're abandoning multilateralism. I said, give me the evidence. We did pull out of the Paris Climate Accord. We did pull out of JCPOA. Then someone said you pulled out of IMF. I said No, the Russians pulled out of IMF five years ago. This is a bipartisan issue. Most of the multilateral fora, most of the international agreements were still there. They're getting stronger. I think NATO -- you know there was NATO week here in Washington recently -- and NATO, the foreign ministers emerged more united. There were stronger conversations about our mutual commitments and our mutual threats, which are pretty severe. So I think when you look at the issue of partnerships we probably aren't creating another NATO very soon. That's the world's most durable security alliance.

这与新的区域伙伴关系问题有关。一周前我在哈佛,他们让我回到那里。我们就谈了这个多边主义和伙伴关系问题。有人说我们放弃了多边主义。我说,拿出证据来。我们是退出了巴黎气候协定。我们是退出了伊朗核协定。有个人还说你们退出了国际货币基金组织。我说不对,是俄国五年前退出了国际货币基金组织。这是一个派性的问题。大多数多边论坛,大多数国际协定还都在的嘛。越来越强了。我想北约 -- 最近华盛顿有个北约周 -- 北约的外交部长结果更团结了。有更强的对话讲我们相互的担当,我们共同的威胁 -- 威胁是严重的。在伙伴关系的问题上,我们也许不会立即再造一个北约。北约是世界上最持久的安全同盟。

But there will be ways I think that we come together in regional partnerships for particular crises.  Perhaps with the Baltic states and Poland to deal with the eastern flank threat. The northern European countries and Britain have talked about partnering with us for others. And in the end of Pacific you know we have a strategy there that was enunciated early on in the Trump administration to bring nations together, to counter China. But there's a lot more…

我想我们有办法用区域伙伴关系来共同对付具体的危机。也许与波罗的海国家和波兰来对付东翼的威胁。北欧国家和英国已经说了与我们合伙对付其他方面的威胁。在太平洋的那一头,我们有一个战略,特朗普政府初期宣布的,多国一起共同对付中国。还有呢 ....

Slaughter:This sounds a lot like Coalitions of the Willing.

斯劳特:像是“自愿者联盟”【2003年入侵伊拉克的多国联盟】。

Skinner:It is. And you've written about this.  But I think that's in some ways going to be more prominent going forward, given the multiplicity of threats. This is a very different century.

斯金纳:就是。你有文章写这个。而且我想,在某些方面更加突出,因为威胁是多重的。这个世纪很不一样。

Slaugher:So if I can summarize the Trump doctrine, you know. the United States is a sovereign nation, guided by its national interests, that expects "I will do for you if you do for us and if we share the burden", which is - It is a realist view of the world. It may not be hostile to multilateralism but it certainly puts the nations first and does not accept many constraints on sovereignty. I was intrigued. I just have to ask what's the Pompeo corollary. Is there a particular difference there?

斯劳特:我来总结一下特朗普主义。美国是一个主权国家,遵循其国家利益,奉行“如果你为我做,如果我们分摊负担,我就为你做”。这是一种现实主义的世界观。可能不否定多边主义,可是一定是以本国为先,不接受任何对主权的限制。我还想知道,我得问问,什么是蓬佩奥的派生思想。有什么特别的不同吗?

Slinner:Yes. In fact Pompeo asked me that very question as so. I said I'll tell you when I know.  But what I think is going on at the State Department under him is that he's attempting to really define in the broad Trump doctrine which addresses economic and defense and a broad range of policy challenges. But what I think Pompeo doctrine is, is trying to define the diplomatic angle in all aspects of what the president's attempting to do:in security, society, the economy, energy and the international system. And in each of those looking at what's the role of the policy.

斯金纳:是有啊。其实蓬佩奥也问了我同样的问题。我说我知道了再跟你说。我觉得,国务院在他的领导下,想在广义上界定特朗普主义。涉及经济、防务,广泛的政策挑战。蓬佩奥主义,就是从外交角度来看总统关注的方方面面:安全、社会、经济、能源、国际体系。确定(外交)政策在每一方面的作用。

Because you know we have a huge defense department, with a big budget, and a lots of boots on the ground all over the world. We don't have as much status as you know. The building just physically tell you a bit about the reality. But the budgets tell you even more. And so trying to assert an American diplomacy in all of these core areas is what I think the Pompeo Corolary to the Trump Doctrine. We were working on that. It's a lot of fun. We have diverse groups of people in Policy Planning, careers, political appointees. There I don't have a political litmus test.  If you are good, you are there. Especially on the career side, on the political side, you do have to bring people in to represent the point of view. But again, some of most talented people I've ever met in the foreign service and civil service.

我们的国防部非常庞大,有庞大的预算,军人遍布全世界。我们国务院的地位就差远了。从办公大楼的大小就可以看出一点这种现实。而预算更能说明问题。我认为蓬佩奥基于特朗普主义的派生思想就是在所有这些核心领域里强调美国外交的作用。我们在这方面做了工作。很有意思。我们政策设计室里有不同的群体,不同的职业经历,不同的行政人员。我不搞政治倾向性的测验。你行,你就来上班。特别是职业经历方面,政治方面,还是要把不同的人招进来,代表不同的观点。在外交和行政事务上有一些我遇到的最有才干的人。

Slaughter: So I want to ask you about how you engage in the diplomacy in a world in whcih -- we are talking about this a lot today --  the President essentially said, in the national security strategy, we see a return to great power competition. So China now and Russia and any others countries --I want to ask you, you might name -- are seen as great powers to whom we are adverse at least much of the time. How does that affect the way the State Department, the entire European department which addresses all of Europe and Russia, and of course East Asian Affairs focused on China. How does that affect the diplomacy to now see them as rival great powers.

斯劳特:那么我就想问你,你是怎样参与在这样一个世界上的外交 -- 今天我们谈了不少 -- 特朗普总统等于是说,在国家安全战略方面,我们回归到了大国竞争。那么,中国、俄国、还有其他什么国家 -- 我想知道,你可以说 -- 被视为与我们作对的大国,至少多数情况下是这样。那么,这对于国务院、对于管整个欧洲和俄国的欧洲组、对于主管中国的东亚组,有什么影响吗?把它们看成大国对手,对外交有什么影响吗?

Skinner:The National Security Strategy was an important document early on in the Trump administration for all the noise that people talked about at the White House and the fact that we were quickly onto our second national security adviser and new deputies. We in record time got a powerful statement in the National Security Strategy of December 2017 and it talked about a return to great power competition and that was a general H.R. McMaster's, I think, big insight. I think we've evolved since then that we do have Russia and China as great power competitors. They've been that for a long time, a lot of this is are cognition of the reality that's been on the ground. But I think we're differentiating those challenges. Russia is more of a kind of a global survivor, I think, in its great power status. But China we see it as a more fundamental long term threat. That's not a partisan issue. And one of the ways in which Donald Trump has contributed to a bipartisan foreign policy consensus is on China.  Because at the start of his presidency there wasn't the kind of understanding that China is the long term threat. It is a real problem.

斯金纳:《国家安全战略》是特朗普政府初期的一份重要文件。那时白宫众说纷纭,很快就有了第二任国家安全顾问,和新的副手。2017年12月,出了《国家安全战略》,这么快就有了一个有力的宣言,在时间上创了纪录。它说的是回归大国竞争。我想,是出于一位将军,麦克马斯特的出色的洞见。【麦克马斯特:美国陆军中将。2017年任特朗普的国家安全顾问,2018年退休】自从那时起我们发展了我们的观点,俄国和中国确实是我们的竞争大国。它们早就是了。主要是对现场现实的认识。我想我们也是区分这些挑战的。我觉得作为大国,俄国更像是国际遗老。而中国,我们认为是更为根本的长期的威胁。两党对此没有分歧。特朗普对两党在外交政策上达成共识的贡献之一就是中国问题。他刚当选总统的时候,人们还不大明白中国是长期的威胁。的确成问题。

Slaughter:So when you say "threat" I would probably say "adversary", I'm not saying "threat".

斯劳特:你说是“威胁”,我可能说是“对手”,不说是“威胁”。

Skinner:I think the vocabulary is still evolving and I would agree with you that it is an adversary. It's in this way. It's a long term fight with China, or a long term competition. It has, I think, historical, ideological and cultural as well as strategic factors that a lot of Americans do not understand, even in the foreign policy community.  To map our chart, our understanding of the world, onto theirs, I think it's a huge mistake. And what we are working on at the State Department is a comprehensive China policy now.  A lot of that is being led on the seventh floor at State, but in close concert with all of the bureaus who are thinking about this regional and functional at the core of their work now.

斯金纳:我想,提法还在发展中。我没准也会同意你说的是“对手”。是这样的。与中国的斗争、或者说与中国的竞争是长期的。我想,很多美国人不理解其中的历史、意识形态、文化以及战略方面的因素。就是搞外交政策的也不理解。把我们对世界的观念、我们对世界的理解安在他们头上,是一种巨大的错误。现在我们在国务院搞的就是全方位的对华政策。主要是国务院七楼主导,也和所有在区域和职能方面有关的部门密切合作,作为他们的核心工作。

Slaughter:Is a strategic and economic dialogue still going with China? Tim Geithner started this. There had been the strategic economic dialogue led by Treasury. Actually that was under George W. Bush and then when Secretary Clinton came in, it became the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, meaning the State Department led it, not Treasury. But I don't know.

斯劳特:与中国还在进行战略和经济对话吗?是从蒂莫西·盖特纳【奥巴马时期的财政部长,中文名“高逸然”】开始的,进行了财政部主导的战略经济对话。其实是在小布什主政时期开始的。后来希拉里成了国务卿,就成了战略经济对话,也就是国务院而不是财政部主导了。我也不太清楚。

Skinner:So this is a very different administration and what the economists and financial people at the White House got hold of China faster than State. And so they've addressed the China trade problem. But what we're doing at State is to say we're in agreement with you on trade, but trade is not the only problem. And maybe not the biggest in the long run with China and perhaps it's really a symptom of the China problem which has deeper historical and strategic roots than we've understood. We have the Indo-Pacific and the trade side.  Those are the ones that raced ahead faster but we're now looking more deeply and broadly at China and I think State is in the lead in that broader attempt to get something like a letter X for China,what Kennan wrote. You can't have a policy without an argument underneath it. What hasn't happened in this century is that we haven't advanced the argument and that's what we're working on both the argument and the broader threat at State. And if it will happen, it will happen at the State Department.

斯金纳:本届政府是很不一样的。是白宫搞经济的、搞财政的比国务院要更早地应对中国。他们搞的是与中国的贸易问题。而我们国务院虽然也同意与中国有贸易问题,但是认为并不只是贸易问题。长远来说可能并不是与中国最大的问题。也许只是中国问题的一个表象,有更深的历史、战略根源,超出我们的理解。我们有印度洋-太平洋和贸易这一方面的问题。这些是先冒出来的问题。而我们现在是要从深度上和广度上来看待中国问题。我想国务院在广度方面起到了主导作用。要为中国搞一个类似凯南写的X信件的东西。【凯南X信件:实为凯南以X为笔名在1947年发表的一篇文章,鼓吹遏制政策】。一种政策不能没有理论支撑。本世纪没有的,就是我们还没有搞出理论来。我们国务院正在搞的就是理论和那个广度的威胁。如果出了理论,就是国务院出的。

So it's different than Russia in that way. It's different as an adversarial dyad than in the 20th century with the Soviet Union, in the sense that not to make light of the Cold War and the reality of a nuclear war that could have happened. In fact that we came close in some instances. But when we think about the Soviet Union in that competition, in a way it was a fight within the Western family. Karl Marx was a German Jew who developed a philosophy that was really within the larger body of political thought that reaches the work that you've done, that I've been involved with,  that has some tenets even within classical liberalism. So in that way I think it was a huge fight within the Western family. You could look at the Soviet Union, part west, part east, but it had some openings there that got us the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which was a really important western concept that opened the door really to undermine the Soviet Union, a totalitarian state on human rights principles.

在这个意义上,中国与俄国不同。作为对手,与20世纪的苏联不同。这么说不是看轻冷战,看轻可能发生的核战争。实际上有几次离核战争很近了。我们讲与苏联竞争,在某种意义上是西方大家庭内部的斗争。卡尔·马克思是德国犹太人,他发展了一种哲学,是在更大的一种政治思想范畴内。这种思想也出现在你写的、我涉及的东西里。这种思想甚至包含着经典自由主义的某些基本理念。在这个意义上,我觉得可以说是西方大家庭内部的大战。看看苏联,半西方、半东方,它有些空隙,让我们在1975年能有赫尔辛基协定【欧美东西方阵营的缓和协定,但没有法律效力】。那确实是一种重要的西方概念,打开了大门,削弱了苏联,一个违背人权原则的极权国家。

That's not really possible with China. This is a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology. The United States doesn't have that before, nor has it had an economic competitor the way that we have. The Soviet Union was a country with nuclear weapons, a hug Red Army, but a backwards economy. And that was the insight of Reagan when the intel community told him differently. He said I just don't see the signs that it can survive a technology race with the West. So in China we have an economic competitor. We have an ideological competitor, one that really does seek a kind of global reach that many of us didn't expect a couple of decades ago. I think it's also striking that's the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian.

而与中国,这就不可能。这是一种与完全不同的文明、不同的意识形态的斗争。美国过去还没有过,也没有过这样的经济竞争对手。苏联这个国家有核武器,庞大的红军,但是经济很落后。这是里根的洞见。而那时情报部门的报告是不同的。他说,我看不出苏联有什么迹象能在技术上竞争得过西方。而中国是经济竞争对手,是意识形态竞争对手。它确实是企图把手伸向全球,而我们许多人在几十年前是根本想不到的。我觉得很震撼的是,这是我们第一次要有一个非白种人的大国竞争对手。

Slaughter:That sounds like Huntington's Clash of Civilizations.

斯劳特:这像是亨廷顿的“文明冲突论”。

Skinner: Some of those tenets but a little bit different. All of those things together are a bit perplexing for the American foreign policy establishment.  I think we have to take the rose colored glasses off and get real about the nature of the threat.  I think we also have to give a kind of respect for what the Chinese seek to accomplish.

斯金纳:有些基本理念是,可是也有些不同。所有这些东西合在一起,让美国外交政策圈子感到很困惑。我觉得我们应该摘下玫瑰色的有色眼镜,看清这种威胁的本质。我也觉得还应该对中国想达到的目标给予某种尊敬。

Slaughter:  I'm gonna turn to the audience in just a minute. So start thinking about your questions. I do want to press you on that. In the United States,  is not all the Caucasian, right? But we're going to be minority by 2050.  So is that even relevant? I mean if I think about the people so, the different races and ethnicities that will make up the United States, Caucasians won't be a majority.

斯劳特:过一会儿就让听众提问,请准备你们的问题。我还想问你的是,在美国,不都是白人吧?到了2050年,我们就会成为少数民族。是不是白人还有关系吗?我是说,美国是由不同的种族和民族组成的,白人将来不会是多数了。

Skinner:I think it's extremely relevant because the foreign policy establishment is so narrowly defined. It's more homogeneous than probably should be, given our own demographics. That's why I think programs like the one at ASU that you've partnered with are extremely valuable in terms of developing new cadre of foreign policy elites. But when I look back to when we went to graduate school, who populates IR departments at the elite universities, (Slaughter: No question in it.) it hasn't changed very much.Look at the faculties of the top 20 IR programs and public policy schools. So I think you know having diversity in all dimensions really does help you get ready for the future. And when you don't have it I think it hurt you. The foreign policy elite community is pretty locked up right now. I hope that is changing.

斯金纳:我觉得非常非常有关系,因为外交政策圈子界定得很狭隘。看看我们的人口组成,它也过于清一色了。所以我觉得你们与亚利桑那州立大学合作的这个节目非常有价值,就在于形成新的外交政策精英群体。回想过去我们读研时,都是谁在读精英大学的国际关系(斯劳特:是啊),现在变化不大嘛。看看顶尖的20个国际关系项目和公共政策院系的教职员队伍。所以我觉得全方位地搞形形色色才能有助于为未来做好准备。如果不是这样,就会造成损害。而如今的外交政策精英圈子很封闭了。希望能有变化。

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发表于 2019-5-17 08:28:15 | 显示全部楼层
美苏矛盾是争夺世界霸权的矛盾。
美俄矛盾是争夺势力范围的矛盾。
中美矛盾是遏制与反遏制的矛盾。
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